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THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT AND THE PROBLEM OF
JURISDICTION IN INTERSTATE ADOPTION:
AN EASY FIX?
BERNADETTE

W.

HARTFIELD*

Introduction
Baby X is born in state A to Betty, an unmarried woman. Betty learns
that Mr. and Mrs. Jones in state B want very much to adopt a baby. She
agrees to permit the Jones to adopt Baby X. Betty assures the Jones that
Baby X's biological father, Frank, showed no interest in her pregnancy,
has no interest in the baby and will not contest the adoption. The Jones
travel to state A and return to state B with Baby X, now a few days old,
and Betty's signed consent to the adoption. The Jones file a petition to
adopt Baby X in state B. Does state B have jurisdiction to grant this
adoption? If Frank chooses to contest the adoption, can he successfully
challenge the jurisdiction of state B? If Frank files a petition to establish
paternity and to obtain custody of Baby X in state A, would state A have
jurisdiction? Would it matter whether Frank's petition was filed before Baby
X was removed from state A? Whether Frank's petition was filed before
the Jones filed their petition in state B? If the court in state B terminates
Frank's parental rights and grants the Jones' petition to adopt, and the
court in state A determines that Frank is Baby X's father and awards
custody to him, which decision controls? Might Baby X have different
parents in state A than she does in state B? And what if the Jones
subsequently move with Baby X to state C?
These questions stimulate spirited discussion in the law school classroom
and provide numerous issues to be addressed in examination bluebooks.
Indeed, these questions seem ideally suited to the realm of hypothesis. If
that were all these were-the source of a good learning experience-there
would be little cause for concern. But these questions are not purely
hypothetical. They are real questions, affecting real people, who need real
answers.' Regrettably, there have been few real answers.
The interstate aspect of the Baby X adoption makes it far more complex
than a similar adoption involving only one state. In an intrastate adoption
where all of the parties are domiciliaries of the forum state, subject matter
and personal jurisdiction will necessarily exist there, and the forum can
render a binding decision. Even if subsequent events required that another
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. J.D., 1977,
University of California, Berkeley; B.A., 1971, Spelman College.
1. The questions are loosely based on Gainey v. Olivo, 258 Ga. 640, 373 S.E.2d 4 (1988),

discussed at infra text accompanying notes 176-83.
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state revisit the controversy, the fact that a judgment was rendered by a
state having jurisdiction (including personal jurisdiction over all the parties)
will ensure that full faith and credit will be given. But, as in the hypothetical,
where more than one state has a colorable claim to subject matter jurisdiction or where the only state having subject matter jurisdiction lacks personal
jurisdiction over one of the parties, problems ensue. The problems are most
acute in interstate adoptions, like that of Baby X, where the parental rights
of the biological parents have not been terminated prior to the commencement of an adoption proceeding.
Because of the mobility of our society and the desirability of interstate
adoption from the perspective of the best interests of children, various
approaches have been developed to facilitate interstate adoption despite the
jurisdictional barriers that would otherwise exist. Unfortunately, the approaches developed in traditional conflict of laws and family law jurisprudence have lacked consistency and uniformity and have often lost sight of
both the best interests of the child and the rights of biological parents.
Renowned scholars have attested to the confusion which is engendered by
slavish adherence to fictional concepts of status and theories of jurisdiction
developed in unrelated contexts. 2 None of these traditional approaches has
yielded interstate jurisdictional rules that serve the interests of all the parties
to the adoption triad (child, adoptive parents and biological parents).
Now, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 which has been
enacted into law in all states and the District of Columbia,4 presents the
possibility of answering some, but not all, of the questions posed above.,
The focus of this article is whether the UCCJA should apply in adoption
proceedings. The Act is silent on the question, as are the comments to its
provisions. Most states have enacted the official version of the UCCJA, as
it relates to covered proceedings, but two states and the District of Columbia
2. A. EmHNzwEI, CONFLICT oF LAws 85 (1962) (discussing status as a res in adoption:
"The law on this topic is badly confused by the promiscuous treatment of several questions,
namely those concerning the validity of a decree of adoption within the adopting state (local

jurisdiction); those concerning the recognition of foreign decrees (international and interstate
jurisdiction); and finally those concerning the applicable law."); H. CLAUC,

TE LAW oF

Doa.snc RELATioNS 872 (2d ed. 1988) ("Subject matter jurisdiction over adoption can fairly
be characterized as both confused and uncertain, largely because the statutes are unclear and
because there is little reasoned discussion in the cases.").
3. 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988) [hereinafter UCCJA]. Throughout the text of this article, the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act will be referred to variously as UCCJA and the Act.
4. UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 115-16 (1988) ("Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted").

5. Also relevant to the problems of jurisdiction in interstate adoption are the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988). which as a federal law applies
to all states, and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) (Am. Pub.
Welfare Ass'n), which has been entered into by all states. A full consideration of these statutes
individually and in conjunction mith the UCCJA is beyond the scope of this article. For
discussion of the PKPA, see Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction,Recognition and
Enforcement, 66 MiNN. L. REv. 711 (1982). For discussion of the ICPC, see Hartfield, The
Role of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children in InterstateAdoption, 68 NEB.
L. REv. 292 (1988).
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have versions that specifically include adoption, 6 two other states have
versions that specifically exclude adoption,7 and one state has a version that
specifically includes custody determination after an adoption has been denied. 8 State courts have similarly split when faced with the question of the
applicability of the UCCJA to adoption as a matter of statutory interpretation. 9 Thus, the law is inconsistent from state to state, a result which is
antithetical to the purposes of the UCCJA.' 0
This article concludes that the better interpretation of the UCCJA extends
its coverage to adoption. As interpreted, the Act would provide a fixed set
of rules by which all states could determine the appropriate forum to exercise
jurisdiction. But effective application of the UCCJA in adoption must
include some accommodation of the due process interests of absent parents
whose parental rights are subject to termination and restraint on the part
of judges where concurrent jurisdiction may exist in more than one state.
The Termination of ParentalRights in InterstateAdoption
As used in this article, adoption means "the legal process by which a
child acquires parents other than his natural parents and parents acquire a
child other than a natural child."" Professor Clark has described adoption
as a two-step process. In the first step, parental rights are terminated, and,
in the second, the new parent-child relationship is created. This frequently
occurs in one proceeding, but it is sometimes accomplished in two separate
proceedings (a termination of parental rights proceeding followed by an
adoption).' 2 Whether adoption is accomplished in one proceeding or two is
determined by the state adoption statutes applicable to the type of adoption
being sought. Adoptions may be either "agency adoptions" in which the
child is relinquished to a public or private adoption agency for adoption
placement, or "private" or "independent adoptions" in which the child is
placed directly, or through an intermediary, with prospective adoptive parents. Often adoptions involving step-parents or relatives are treated differ-

6. Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-42 (Supp. 1981)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 407-103 (1989)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4502 (1981)). Michigan, which had
a version of the UCCJA that included adoption, amended its statute deleting the reference to
adoption. MICH. Com. LAws § 600.652 (1981), amended by 1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 66. See
supra text accompanying note 194.
7. New York (N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 75-c (1988)) and New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 458-A:2 (1983)). Tennessee (Tmm. CODE ANN. § 36-6-202(3) (1984)) excludes proceedings pursuant to title 37, which includes the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children regulating interstate adoption placement.
8. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 43-1202 (3)(d) (1988).
9. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
10. UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A 124 (1988) (One of the purposes of the UCCJA is to "make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.").
11. H. C.ARK, supra note 2, at 850. The terms "natural" and "biological" are used
interchangeably to describe a child's birthparents.
12. Id.
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ently than adoptions involving strangers and form another category of
13
adoption.

State adoption statutes typically require the consent of the biological
parent to an adoption, but waive the consent requirement in specified
circumstances. 4 If the biological parent has consented to the adoption, or
if grounds for waiving the requirement exist, the termination of parental
rights and the creation of the new parent-child relationship may occur in
one proceeding. This often occurs in independent adoptions. More often in
agency adoptions, parental rights are terminated before an adoption petition
is filed. 15 However, if consent is required and the biological parent has not
consented or relinquished her rights, the adoption can take place only if
the biological parent's parenlal rights are terminated in a separate proceeding
6
according to statutory grounds for termination.
While there is considerable support for separate termination of parental
rights proceedings before an adoption petition may be filed, 7 many states
13. H. G=rn,

ADoPrioNs: AN AroRNEY's GuDE TO HELPIN

(1987).
14. W. MEzAN, S.

ADo nvI

PARENTS 8-9

& ]3. Russo, ADOPTIONS WrrHOUT AoNCIES: A STUDY OF
150 (1978). "The consent assures the court that the biological parent
is giving up his or her child voluntarily and understands the implication of consenting to the
adoption-that the parent-child relationship will be completely and permanently severed.
Furthermore, consent affords protection to the prospective adoptive parents as a legal guarantee
of the child's availability." Id. The consent requirement is usually waived if the parent had
abandoned the child. E.g., Ueir. ADOPTION ACT § 6(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 28 (1971). Consent may
also be waived for failure to communicate with or support the child for a specified period
when the child is in the custody of another. Waiver on this basis is sometimes limited to
adoptions by a step-parent or relative. E.g., GA. Con ANN. § 74-410 (Supp. 1990). The
parental consent requirement is waived where parental rights have been relinquished to an
adoption agency or where parental rights have been previously terminated. E.g., UmNP. ADopTIoN ACT § 6(a)(4), (5), 9 U.L.A. 29 (1971). In those circumstances consent of the agency or
the child's guardian would be required. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 880-81. Until the Supreme
Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), unwed fathers were largely ignored
in adoption. Most pre-Stanley statutes required only the mother's consent for the adoption of
an out-of-wedlock child. Most statutes now require that notice and an opportunity to be heard
must be provided to unwed fathers. H. CLAUC, supra note 2, at 860-62.
15. This is the recommended practice in agency adoptions. "For the protection of the
KATZ

INDEPENDENT ADOPONS

child, the natural parents and the agency, legally binding termination of parental rights and

the establishment of a recognized legal status between the child and the agency should take
place prior to any steps being taken toward adoption." CHL WEL.ARE LEAGuE OF AMERICA,
STANDARDS FOR ADOPTiON SERVcE § 7.26, at 106 (1978).
16. Typical grounds include, but are not limited to, abuse, neglect, and unfitness. See
generally H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 893-905; S. KATZ, R. HowE & McGRATH, Cmw NEGLECT
LAws IN AmERIcA (1975).
17. The Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement, authored by Professor
Katz,

declares invalid all non-judicial attempts at severance of the parent-child relationship by contractual arrangements. Termination of a parent-child relationship
involves a serious reordering of personal statuses and legal rights and obligations.
A judicial proceeding is necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of all
parties are recognized and enforced ....
MODEL ACT TO FREE CHILDREN FOR PERmANENT PLA EmENT § I commentary, reprinted in
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continue to permit the termination of parental rights to occur as a part of
the adoption proceeding. In fact, in some instances, a separate proceeding
to terminate parental rights is not feasible, especially in independent adoptions where no agency is available to assume responsibility for the child in
the interim between termination of parental rights and adoption. 18 Further,
statutes governing termination proceedings may limit the persons who may
bring the action, 19 and state law may not authorize the court to terminate
parental rights on the same grounds applicable to an adoption proceeding
when no adoption is pending or contemplated in that state. 20 Finally, a
separate termination proceeding would likely involve additional cost and
delay. Therefore, while termination of parental rights in a separate proceeding prior to adoption would avoid some of the jurisdictional problems
addressed in this article, there remain circumstances in which a separate
proceeding would be unavailable or unworkable.
In an interstate adoption such as that in the Baby X hypothetical, the
Jones would probably be unable to adopt Baby X in state A because they
are neither residents nor domiciliaries of state A. The preferred approach
would then be to terminate all parental rights in state A before initiating
an adoption in state B, because the state A court would have personal
jurisdiction over the biological parents. But if the Jones lack standing to
initiate a termination of parental rights proceeding or if termination would
require the appointment of an agency custodian or if the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights because no adoption in state
A is pending or contemplated, a termination proceeding in state A may not
be possible. If the adoption, including termination of parental rights, is
pursued in state B, the problem of personal jurisdiction over the state A
parent remains. Therefore, an adoption might not be possible because of
the jurisdictional barriers, even if it would best serve the interests of Baby
X.
Katz, Freeing Children for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 203,
208 (1978). Some provision is made in the Act for relinquishments to be made to agencies
with subsequent ratification by the court. Id. Compare MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT (Draft
1984), reprintedin 19 Fcm. L.Q. 103 (1985) (no judicial proceeding to terminate parental rights
as part of adoption statute; consents and relinquishments must be filed with the court;
involuntary terminations based on implied consent as part of adoption proceeding).
18. See H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 880.
19. This problem is avoided in the Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement
as to voluntary termination, because either the parent or an agency may file a petition. MODEL
ACT To FaRE CHi.DREN FOR P RmANENT PLAcmN § 8, reprinted in Katz, supra note 17, at
222. However, a petition seeking involuntary termination could not be filed by a prospective
adoptive parent who is neither the child's guardian, legal custodian or de facto parent (of a
child in foster care). Id.
20. Cf. H.C.S. v. Grebel, 253 Ga. 404, 321 S.E.2d 321, 322 (1984) (To avoid frustrating
interstate adoption, the court held that a termination of parental rights in contemplation of
adoption in another state was "in connection with adoption proceedings" within the meaning
of the Georgia adoption statute.). The same problem would exist under the revised Uniform
Adoption Act which authorizes voluntary and involuntary termination either prior to or in an
adoption proceeding. UNiT. ADoPnON ACT § 19, 9 U.L.A. 71-72 (1971).
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Theories of Jurisdiction in Adoption Prior to UCCJA
It comes as no great surprise that much of the confusion about "jurisdiction" in adoption results from the use of the single term as a label for2
widely varying circumstances in which courts may render binding decisions. '
Jurisdiction may be "local," that is, binding within the state, or "interstate," which means binding in other states as well under full faith and
credit. Two major categories of local jurisdiction may be identified as subject
matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over persons and property.2 The existence of jurisdiction over persons and property-also known as personal,
judicial or territorial jurisdiction-is determined by whether the proceeding
is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.?
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
There is some authority that subject matter jurisdiction may be further
subdivided into (1) "competence" (connotes a decision by the state to limit
the controversies a court can decide, as with courts of limited jurisdiction)
and (2) the proper presence of the res before the court in an in rem
proceeding.? It is a question of "jurisdiction" whether a particular category
of court within a state court system can entertain an adoption proceeding
at all.? It is also a question of "jurisdiction" whether a court, authorized
by statute to decide adoption cases, can entertain an adoption proceeding
initiated by a certain class of petitioners, such as nonresidents or recent
emigres. 26 Both of these questions relate to subject matter jurisdiction in
the sense of "competence" 27 of the court to decide certain controversies.
Indeed, they may be viewed as the easy questions of subject matter jurisdiction, because they are typically answered explicitly by the terms of state

21. "The word 'jurisdiction' has too many meanings. Because of that it is a prime source
of confusion and ambiguity in the law. About all that can be done about it is to try to be

sure of the sense in which the word is being used at any given time." R. Lmu.AR, L. McDouoAL
& R. FEx, AmmucAN CoNrmrcTs LAW 5 (1986) [hereinafter LEaAx].

22. A. EHanNZWmo, supra note 2, at 72 ("The question which court, if any, 'has' (local)
jurisdiction is ambiguous: it may refer to the court's jurisdiction proper (over parties or things)
or so-called jurisdiction over the subject matter.").
23. E. ScorEs & P. HAY, CoN-ucT oF LAWS 211 (1982) [hereinafter ScoLs & HAY].
24. A. EmENzwEIo, supra note 2, at 73 ("[Subject matter jurisdiction], too, is ambiguous:
it may designate a type of case over which the state has 'given to the court the power to

entertain the action,' [RESTATEMENT OF JuDGMErs § 7 comment a (1942)] and may in this
sense be used 'more or less interchangeably' with the term 'competency'; or it may denote the
fact that the res supporting an in rem or quasi in rem action ... has been properly brought
before the court." (citation omitted)); Ratner, ProceduralDue Process and Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate, 75 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 363, 409 (1980) [hereinafter Due Process]; cf.H. CLARK, supra
note 2, at 869-74. Other authorities use subject matter jurisdiction to mean competency.
LEFLAR, supra note 21, at 5; R. WEmT.AuB, CoMENTARY ON THE CONFICT OF LAWS 92
(1980); E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, supra note 23, at 216.
25. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 869.
26. Id.
27. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
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adoption statutes.2 The harder questions of subject matter jurisdiction
pertain to the traditional classification of adoption as a proceeding affecting
30
status, 9 and are not answered by reference to adoption statutes.
Jurisdiction Over Persons and Property
Jurisdiction in this sense requires varying degrees of connectedness between the forum state and the person or thing over which that state seeks
to exercise authority. Traditionally, the degree of connectedness required
has depended upon the classification of the proceeding as in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem and the limitations imposed by due process considerations. Most often adoption is classified as a status proceeding to which
special jurisdictional rules apply,31 but there is also support for the classification of adoption as an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding. 32 The res in
an adoption proceeding has been identified as the child's status, 33 or, in
one case, as the child.3 There is also confusion here as to labelling, with
some references to 'in rem' jurisdiction over property as subject matter
jurisdiction (apparently because subjects or things were 'seized') to distinguish it from 'in personam' jurisdiction over the parties

....

,,35

Jurisdiction Based on Status
Adoption has been viewed as a status proceeding, that is, one that affects
the existence of the relationship between parent and child. 6 Status has been
described as a "creature of the law, ' 37 as having only "an imaginary
28. Most state statutes indicate the court in which an adoption proceeding may be commenced (e.g., juvenile court, superior court, family court, etc.), durational residency requirements for petitioners, if any, (typically six months to one year), and the proper venue (often
held to be jurisdictional) based on the residency of one or more of the parties. E.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-4 (1986) (specifying superior court and six month residency requirement for
adoption of unrelated persons); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-402 to 74-403 (Supp. 1990) (specifying
superior court in where petitioner has resided for six months). See generally H. CLARK, supra
note 2, at 869-70.
29. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 870. See infra text accompanying notes 36-50.
30. Professor Clark has criticized the application of common law jurisdictional requirements
in adoption cases, because adoption is a statutory proceeding, unknown at common law. H.
CLARK, supra note 2, at 870.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 36-50.
32. Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 222, 229 (1954)
("There seems to be a more or less inchoate notion that adoption ... operates in rem or
quasi in rem, though agreement as to the identity of the res and as to its situs does not

exist.").
33. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 871 (criticizing the theory as "pseudo-analysis"). The
identification of the child's status as the res in an in rem proceeding limits the permissible
forums to that of the child's domicile, as contrasted with the status proceeding classification
in which the various statuses affected can be considered. See infra text accompanying notes
40-50.
34. Portman v. Mobley, 158 Ga. 269, 123 S.E. 695, 697 (1924) (Russell, C.J., concurring).
35. Due Process, supra note 24, at 409.
36. Taintor, supra note 32, at 222; LEneAR, supra note 21, at 663; H. CLARK, supra note
2, at 870-71.
37. H. CARK, supra note 2, at 870-71.
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form;" ' 3a nonetheless, it has been located at the state of domicile, and
jurisdiction in adoption has been found to exist there, because only the
domicile possesses the authority to create status. 9 If all the parties to the
adoption triad are domiciled in the same state, then jurisdiction to grant
the adoption exists there.4 But if two or three different domiciles are
involved, deciding which state has jurisdiction has proved difficult. The
effort has been undertaken, however, because of the realization that some
desirable adoptions would otherwise be impossible.
This approach to jurisdiction in adoption is roughly analogous to that
utilized in migratory divorce cases. 41 A forum state has jurisdiction to
terminate the marriage status if the petitioning spouse is domiciled there. 42
The forum state may terminate the marriage despite the lack of personal
jurisdiction over the other spouse. However, domicile of the petitioner does
not confer jurisdiction on the forum state to adjudicate related issues4 3
such as custody, alimony, child support, and property division. 4 4
Following the divorce analogy, one might expect that, as the petitioning
parties, the adoptive parents' domicile at the forum should be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. However, the cases that have looked to domicile as the
jurisdictional predicate vary. Some have looked to the domicile of the child,
where the domicile of the child is not the same as that of the adoptive
parents. 45 Others have looked to the domicile of the adoptive parents, on
the curious basis that the child will, in all instances, benefit from the
adoption, but the adoptive parents will be burdened unless the adoptive
parents' domicile confers jurisdiction."
The First Restatement provided that the adoption status could be created
at either (1) the domicile of the child; or (2) the domicile of the adoptive
parents, but only if that state had jurisdiction over the child's custodian or
if the child was orphaned or abandoned in that state.4 7 The Second Restatement also accepts the domicile of the child or that of the adoptive parents,
but requires that personal jurisdiction exist over the adoptive parents and
either the child or the child's custodian.4 s The Restatement view has been
38. Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, U. CHi. L. Rxv. 42, 52
(1940).
39. Id. at 52; LELA,
supra note 21, at 664.
40. ScoLas & HAY, supra note 23, at 541-42; LEa.FAR, supra note 21, at 664.
41. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 871; Note, The UCCJA Coming of Age, 34 MERCER L.
Ray. 861, 867 (1983).
42. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (decision based on full faith and

credit).
43.

RESTATmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77 (1971).
44. Generally, personal jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary spouse would be required to
decide the economic issues. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354
U.S. 416 (1957). Issues of support might be decided through the use of a version of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. For the adjudication of custody issues,
jurisdiction would be determined under the UCCJA.
45. E.g., Appeal of Wolf, 10 Sad. 139, 13 A. 760 (Pa. 1888).
46. See, e.g., Appeal of Woodward, 81 Conn. 152, 70 A. 453 (1908).
47. RESTATEMENT (FmsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1934).

48.

RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 78 (1971).
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criticized on the basis that requiring personal jurisdiction over an abandoning
or unknown parent (whose parental rights have not been terminated by a
court) would thwart many adoptions. 49 A slightly modified approach has
been recognized in which notice and opportunity to be heard, rather than
50
personal jurisdiction, has been deemed sufficient.
ConstitutionalLimitations on the Exercise of
Jurisdiction Under TraditionalTheories
The two primary sources of limitations imposed by the Constitution on
the exercise of jurisdiction by the states are the due process clause and the
full faith and credit clause.-1 The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment limits the exercise of jurisdiction by a state in the interest of
fairness,5 2 while the full faith and credit clause prevents relitigation and
promotes federal unity by requiring states to recognize and enforce sister
state judgments.5 As noted above, the classification of adoption as a status
proceeding has been interpreted to negate the due process requirement of
personal jurisdiction.5 4 Instead, the due process clause has traditionally been
interpreted to require only the procedural protections of notice and the
opportunity to be heard.55 Because the Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of whether due process requires personal jurisdiction over a
biological parent, whose parental rights have not been terminated, before
an adoption can be granted, much attention has been focused on the Court's
pronouncements in the area of child custody in divorce. Here again, the
Court has not addressed the precise issue of whether due process mandates
personal jurisdiction over a parent in a custody action, but the Court has
considered the applicability of full faith and credit in custody in People ex
rel. Halvey v. Halvey,5 6 May v. Anderson,5 Kovacs v. Brewer," and Ford
v. Ford5 9-four much-criticized cases.60
49. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 872, 874-75.
50. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 22, at 87.
51. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. Rav. 795, 795 (1964)
[hereinafter Child Custody].
52. "In recent years due process requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction by state

courts, as delineated by the Supreme Court, have been concerned not so much with the presence
of the parties or the subject matter of the litigation within the territory of the state, as with
fairness to both parties at the place of trial." Id.

53. Id.
54. Note, supra note 41, at 866 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878)).
55. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Prelude to
Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. Ray. 379, 397 (1959).
56. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
57. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).

58. 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
59. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
60. Commentators criticizing the cases include Hazard, supra note 55, at 379; S. KATz,
CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL REsPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN 56-61 (1981); H.
CLARK, supra note 2, at 459-63; Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAvis L. RE,. 229, 248 (1979);

Child Custody, supra note 51; Due Process, supra note 24.
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In Halvey, the court held that full faith and credit did not prevent a
reviewing court from modifying a custody decree. While the Court did not
specifically hold that full faith and credit must be afforded to custody
decrees, it implied so. In May, a plurality of the court held that a custody
decree rendered without in personam jurisdiction over an absent parent need
not be afforded full faith and credit. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter took the position that the decree could be granted comity, but
that full faith and credit was not required because the reviewing state has
an interest in the welfare of children within its borders that is stronger than
"the interest of national unity." 6' Like Halvey, May seemed to invite

relitigation of custody. This trend was continued by the Court in Kovacs.
There, the Court held that a reviewing court could modify a decree on the
basis of changed circumstances without violating the full faith and credit
clause. 62 Finally, in Ford, the Court avoided the full faith and credit issue
by relying on the doctrine of res judicata, thereby concluding that where
custody was decided by an agreement between the parties, the custody order
was not res judicata according to the law of the rendering state. Therefore,
the reviewing 6state
was free to make an independent determination on the
3
custody issue.

Viewed together, these cases have been described as reflecting a 'hands
off' approach" to full faith and credit as applied to custody.6 Additionally,
these cases have been blamed for the confusion surrounding custody jurisdiction and the proliferation of child snatching.65 Finally, the implication
of May that in personam jurisdiction is required by due process called into
question the prevailing view that custody jurisdiction existed at the child's
domicile .6
Professor Hazard has considered the possibility of the extension of May
to divorce:
This possibility exists, first because in many situations a divorce
custody decree is the foundation for a subsequent adoption proceeding. Secondly, the policy consideration-"precious parental
right"-said by the Court to underlie the requirement of personal
jurisdiction in custody cases, if it applies at all to adoptions,
applies with even greater force since adoption results in total
termination of the natural parent's rights in the child. 67
Professor Hazard cautions that the application of May to adoptions could
nullify thousands of adoptions and constrict opportunities for the adoption
of "children of adversity," resulting in their long-term institutionalization."
61. May, 345 U.S. at 536.
62. Kovacs, 356 U.S. at 607-08.
63. Ford, 371 U.S. at 194.
64. S. KATz, supra note 60, at 56.
65. Hazard, supra note 55, at 394-95.
66. May, 345 U.S. at 539-42 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. Hazard, supra note 55, at 396.
68. Id. at 399.
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He sees as the best ground for distinguishing May the higher intensity of
public interest in adoption, such that "the value of giving the child a legally
unassailable parentage" overrides the value of personal service of process. 69
Professor Clark has suggested that a footnote in Stanley v. Illinois ° seemed
to "relegate May v. Anderson to the rubbish heap" because it endorsed
71
service by publication in a termination proceeding to permit an adoption.
However, Professor Clark also notes that May was cited with approval in
72
Stanley.
A Brief Description of the UCCJA
The UCCJA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1968 in an
effort to redress the problems engendered by conflicting custody orders from
different states.73 The phenomenon most frequently identified as the focus
of the UCCJA was that of parental child snatching following divorce in
order to forum shop. Prior to the promulgation of the UCCJA, jurisdictional rules encouraged a parent who lost in a custody battle in one state
to grab the child and move to another state where the custody issue could
be relitigated.7 4 The loser in the first custody battle would likely prevail in
the second, because the court in the second forum would likely reach a
result favoring its (new) domiciliary and keeping the child within its jurisdictional reach.
The UCCJA was designed to end the forum shopping and repeated
litigation, which were acknowledged by experts in law and mental health to
be extremely harmful to the interests of children.73 To that end, the Act
established (1) jurisdictional rules that limit the permissible forums to those
most closely connected to the child, (2) rules of priority and methods of
interstate communication between courts to resolve remaining jurisdictional
disputes, and (3) rules of comity to provide for recognition and enforcement
of sister state custody decisions. 76 Although the UCCJA came about to
remedy the problems of interstate divorce custody litigation, by its terms,
it is not limited in its application to divorce custody disputes. Both the
definitional section and the comment to that section indicate that the Act
covers other custody determination proceedings as well, including those
where custody is only one of the issues to be decided.Y
69. Id. at 398.
70. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

71. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 875.
72. Id.
73. UCCJA prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 116-17 (1988).

74. See id.
75. See generally S. KArz, supra note 60; Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction, 27 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. Ray. 297 (1981).
76. See UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. 123-24 (1988) (purposes of the Act).

77. "Custody proceeding" is defined in the UCCJA to include "proceedings in which a
custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action for divorce or separation,
and includes child neglect and dependency proceedings." Further, the comment counsels that
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Bases Upon Which JurisdictionMay Be Exercised
The UCCJA sets out four alternative bases upon which a court that is
otherwise competent to decide child custody matters can establish jurisdiction
to make a custody determination.78 For convenience, the four types of
jurisdiction are referred to below as "home state," "significant connection,"
"emergency" and "default." These bases for jurisdiction represent a radical
departure from the pre-UCCJA law, which required the presence of the
79
child (and often nothing else) to establish jurisdiction to adjudicate custody.
The UCCJA specifically rejects physical presence alone as the basis for
conferring jurisdiction, except in the limited circumstances described under
'
"emergency jurisdiction" and "default jurisdiction.' "8
Further, the Act does
not require the child's presence in the forum as a prerequisite to the exercise
of jurisdiction."' The presence of the child is deemed desirable, however,
and the Act includes provisions by which the court can compel the child's
attendance.82
"Home State" Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction may be claimed on the basis that the forum is the "home
state" of the child.83 "Home state" is defined as the state where the child
lived with parents, a parent or a parent substitute for six consecutive months
or from birth for a child less than six months of age. The six-month
period must have been immediately prior to the commencement of the
proceeding and includes periods of temporary absence. A state that was the
home state within six months prior to the commencement of the proceeding
can also exercise jurisdiction on this basis, even if the child has been removed
from the state, provided that a parent or parent substitute continues to live
in the state.15 Thus, if a child lived in state A with her mother from January

"custody proceeding" is to be construed broadly. UCCJA § 2(3), 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988).
However, the UCCJA does not confer jurisdiction to determine child support or other monetary
obligations. The definitional section specifically states that such decisions are not "custody
determinations." Id. §2(2).
78. UCCJA § 3,9 U.L.A. 143-44 (1988).
79. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: InitialJurisdictionand ContinuingJurisdiction Under
the UCCJA, 14 F. . L.Q. 203, 204 (1981); see also Coombs, Interstate Child Custody:
Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MIN. L. REv. 711, 719-21 (1982).
80. UCCJA § 3(b), 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
81. UCCJA § 3(c), 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988).
82. Section I1of the UCCJA provides that the court may order persons within and without
the state to appear with the child. The comment to the section provides in part: "Since a
custody proceeding is concerned with the past and future care of the child by one of the
parties, it is of vital importance in most cases that the judge has an opportunity to see and
hear the contestants and the child. UCCJA § 11 comment, 9 U.L.A. 271 (1988). Section 11
also provides for the payment of travel costs by another party, as ordered by the court. Id.

§ 11(c).
83. UCCJA § 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 143.
84. UCCJA § 2, 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988).
85. UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 143 (1988).
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through July and was taken by her father to state B in August, state A
could exercise jurisdiction in a proceeding filed there in November, although
the child had not lived in state A for the six consecutive months from May
to November. The comment to this paragraph explains that by giving a
stay-at-home parent six months to initiate custody proceedings, forum shopping is discouraged.86
While the text of the UCCJA does not state a preference for "home
state" jurisdiction, the comment to section 3 indicates that "[fin the first
place, a court in the child's home state has jurisdiction ... ."8 Some courts
have viewed the Act as giving "home state" jurisdiction priority, 8 while
others have not. 9
Significant Connection Jurisdiction
The second basis upon which jurisdiction may be founded is the best
interest of the child where there is (1) a significant connection to and (2)
substantial evidence in the forum.90 Both requirements of contacts with the
forum and availability of evidence in the forum must be satisfied. The
significant connection must exist between the child and his parents, and the
forum state, or between the child and at least one contestant, and the forum
state.91 The conjunctive suggests that the significant connection test would
not be met if the parent or contestant had significant connections in the
forum, but the child had none. Conversely, a forum with which the child
had significant connections (but which was not the "home state") could
not claim jurisdiction on that basis in the absence of connections to a
parent or contestant.
Although the text of the statute does not require it, the comment indicates
that "significant connection" jurisdiction is a secondary or alternative ground.
The preferred basis for establishing jurisdiction is the existence of a "home
state." The comment provides that "if there is no home state or the child
and his family have equal or stronger ties with another state, a court in
that state has jurisdiction."92 The text of tfie statute and the comment do
not prohibit a state with significant connections from exercising jurisdiction,
even where a home state exists. Much of the criticism of the UCCJA has
been directed toward this concept of concurrent jurisdiction and its potential
86. UCCJA § 3 comment, 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988).
87. This approach to "home state" jurisdiction may be contrasted with that of the PKPA,
which permits the exercise of significant connection jurisdiction as an alternative to "home
state" jurisdiction only if no other state would have "home state" jurisdiction. If another
state would have home state jurisdiction, "significant connection" jurisdiction may not be
exercised by the forum, unless the "home state" declines to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§1738A(c) (1988).
88. E.g., Grayson v. Grayson, 454 A.2d 1297 (Del. 1982); Hattoum v. Hattoum, 295 Pa.
Super. 169, 441 A.2d (1982).
89. E.g., Brokus v. Brokus, 420 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); William L. v. Michele
P., 99 Misc.2d 346, 416 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Fam.Ct. 1979).
90. UCCJA § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 143 (1988).
91. Id.
92. UCCJA § 3 comment, 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988).
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to invite jurisdictional competition.93 The drafters recognized that concurrent
jurisdiction would be troublesome; to their credit, they included both procedures to be followed when a court learns of simultaneous proceedings
elsewhere and authority for a court having jurisdiction to decline to exercise
it in favor of a "more convenient forum." 95
They also underscored the need for the Act to be interpreted according
to "the spirit of the legislative purposes," especially the purpose "to limit
jurisdiction rather than proliferate it."96 Moreover, the first clause of section
3(a)(2) is to be viewed as an overarching term of limitation, such that
"jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's interest. The interest of the
child is served when the forum has optimum access to relevant evidence
about the child and family. There must be maximum rather than minimum
contact with the state." 97 Despite the exhortations of the drafters, some
courts have claimed jurisdiction when a forum with stronger contacts and
better access to evidence was available.98 This has led to judicial standoffs,
with courts issuing conflicting decrees, thereby signalling to custody contestants that forum shopping remains a viable option under the UCCJA.
Emergency Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction on this basis requires both that the child be physically present
in the forum and that the child has been abandoned or is in danger because
of abuse or neglect. 99 The text of the statute does not use the term "emergency" in relation to jurisdiction based on abandonment; instead, an emergency is required if jurisdiction is based on threatened or actual abuse or
neglect. However, the comment provides that the jurisdiction conferred by
this section is a reaffirmation of the parenspatriaejurisdiction of the forum
"when a child is in a situation requiring immediate protection."I1 °° This
section has been interpreted to confer jurisdiction to make temporary orders
1
only. 01

Default Jurisdiction
If it is in the best interest of the child to do so, a court may exercise
jurisdiction if no other state has jurisdiction under the preceding provisions
93. E.g., Blakesley, Child Custody-JurisdictionandProcedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291 (1986);
Coombs, Interstate Child Custody, 66 MINN. L. Ray. 711 (1982); Foster, Child Custody
Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L.S. L. R-v. 297, 342 (1981) (stating that the
concurrent jurisdiction is preferable despite its shortcomings, because it allows for flexibility
in the interest of the child).
94. UCCJA § 6, 9 U.L.A. 219-20 (1988).
95. UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 233 (1988).
96. UCCJA § 3 comment, 9 U.L.A. 145 (1988).
97. Id.
98. E.g., Lustig v. Lustig, 99 Mich. App. 716, 299 N.W.2d 375 (1980).
99. UCCJA § 3(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988).
100. UCCJA § 3 comment, 9 U.L.A. 145 (1988).
101. Hache v. Riley, 186 N.J. Super. 119, 1 A.2d 971 (1982); Nussbaumer v. Nussbaumer,
442 So.2d 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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or if another state declines to exercise jurisdiction in favor of the forum.0 2
Resolution of.Conflicting Claims to Jurisdiction
The UCCJA provides two primary means of resolving conflicting claims
of jurisdiction. First, section 6 establishes a "first in time" rule to force a
state to defer to the jurisdiction of another state where a proceeding is
already pending. Under section 6, if the first state's exercise of jurisdiction
was "substantially in conformity with [the] Act," the second state must
yield. Second, section 7 provides authority for an inconvenient forum to
decline to exercise jurisdiction in favor of "a more convenient forum."
Thus, the first state to exercise jurisdiction may determine that, pursuant
to section 7, "it is in the interest of the child that another state assume
1 4
jurisdiction."103 Using what the comment describes as "novel methods," 0
courts involved in simultaneous proceedings are required to communicate
with each other for the purpose of exchanging information and, where
possible, to reach an agreement as to which court will exercise jurisdiction.10 The discovery of potentially conflicting assertions of jurisdiction is aided
by section 9, which requires that parties submit affidavits disclosing prior
and pending custody proceedings and identifying others who have physical
custody or who claim rights to custody or visitation.10 6
Notice Provisions
Two notice provisions are contained in the UCCJA. The first pertains to
notice within the state and provides that notice be given to contestants,
parents (whose parental rights have not been terminated), and persons with
physical custody of the child.lc 7 The method of providing notice is not
102. UCCJA § (a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988).
103. UCCJA § 7(c), 9 U.L.A. 233 (1988). The full text provides:
(c) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is
in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose
it may take into account the following factors, among others:
(1) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his
family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily
available in another state;
(4) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less
appropriate; and
(5) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would
contravene any of the purposes stated in section 1.

Id.
104. UCCJA § 6 comment, 9 U.L.A. 220 (1988).

105. Under section 6, a court having reason to believe that a prior proceeding is pending
elsewhere must inquire of the appropriate officials in the other state. Id. § 6(b). The court is
required to communicate with the court in another state upon learning of a pending proceeding
there, regardless of which proceeding was commenced first. Id. §6(c).
106. UCCJA § 9, 9 U.L.A. 266 (1988).
107. UCCJA § 4, 9 U.L.A. 208 (1988).
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specified, but the comment to the section states that notice is to be provided
pursuant to state law. 08 The second notice provision applies to persons
outside the state who are to be given notice "in a manner reasonably
calculated to give actual notice," which may be by personal delivery, by
mail, or as directed by the court."' 9 The notice requirement is waived "if a
person submits to the jurisdiction of the court." 110 The comment to section
5 warns that "notice and opportunity to be heard must always meet due
process requirements as they exist at the time of the proceeding.""' Neither
the text of this section nor the comment discusses the implicit result of the
existence of the out-of-state notice provision in the context of a custody
jurisdiction statute-the rights of out-of-state parents may be adjudicated
by a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over them." 2 That this was the
intended result is confirmed by section 12, which declares a decree binding
on all parties notified pursuant to section 5,113 and by the comment to
section 12.114 While the comment attempts to distinguish away any conflict
between the UCCJA approach and the Supreme Court's decision in May
v. Anderson,"5 there remains a question of whether due process requires
more than notice to an out-of-state parent." 6
Recognition and Enforcement of Sister State Decrees
Once a custody decree is rendered by a state having jurisdiction under
the UCCJA, the decree is valid within that state and is binding on those
who were provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.1 7 Although
some decrees may be modified,"' until a decree is modified, it is to be
treated as a final judgment and accorded res judicata effect." 9 Just as
section 12 outlines the final and binding nature of a decree in the rendering
state, section 13 establishes a rule of comity that requires a sister state to
recognize and enforce a valid decree as well. 2" The essential inquiry is
108. UCCJA § 4 comment, 9 U.L.A. 208 (1988).
109. UCCJA § 5, 9 U.L.A. 212 (1988). The comment to § 5 expresses the intent to comply

with the due process requirements of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950) and Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), and acknowledges reliance
on § 2.01 of the UrNroim INTERSTATE AND INTmwEATioNAL PaocEDan AcT, 9B U.L.A. 315
(1966). UCCJA § 5, 9 U.L.A. 213 (1938).
110. UCCJA § 5(d), 9 U.L.A. 212 (1988).
111. Id. § 5 comment.
112. See In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1981).
113. UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988).
114. "There is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory
that custody determinations, as distinguished from support actions... are proceedings in rem

or proceedings affecting status." UCCJA § 12 comment, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988).
115. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).

116. See Hogue, Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Congress Legislates Finality
for Child Custody Decrees, I GA. ST. U.L. Rnv. 157, 177-79 (1985). The problem of due
process and personal jurisdiction is dis,.ussed infra text accompanying notes 196-97.
117.
118.
119.
120.

UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988).
For example, divorce custody decrees are modifiable, but adoption decrees are not.
UCCJA § 12 comment, 9 U.L.A. 275 (1988).
UCCJA § 13, 9 U.L.A. 276 (1988).
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whether the decree was rendered by a court having "jurisdiction under
statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act

....

-,2,

Alternatively, if the factual circumstances would have supported jurisdiction
in the rendering court under the UCCJA, the decree is entitled to recognition
and enforcement.'2
Jurisdiction to modify a decree is not directly relevant to adoption, which
results in a final nonmodifiable judgment, except to the extent of reinforcing
the policy of the UCCIA as found in its provisions that restrict modification.
To limit relitigation, the UCCJA prohibits a state from modifying the
custody decree of another state unless two conditions are met. First, the
state that rendered the decree must lack jurisdiction at the time modification
is sought; and, second, the forum state must have jurisdiction.12 Thus, a
state that can establish that it is now the home state of the child may not
modify a decree rendered by a court in the child's former home state, unless
the former home state has lost jurisdiction. The former home state would
have lost jurisdiction if "all the persons involved have moved away or the
contact with the state has otherwise become slight . .

.,,1

Although a court may refuse to recognize an out-of-state custody decree
rendered without substantial compliance with the UCCJA, it may not modify
such a decree if the rendering court would have jurisdiction under the Act
at the time the modification is sought.' zs If the two conditions are met to
authorize modification, the forum court is required to consider the record
from prior proceedings in order to make a better informed decision in the
interest of the child.'1 s
Whether the UCCJA Applies in Adoption
The issue of whether the UCCJA applies in adoption proceedings arises
because the Act is silent as to adoption. In the UCCJA's definitional section,
"custody determination" is defined as "a court decision and court orders
and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation
rights; it does not include a decision relating to child support or any other
monetary obligation of any person." 12 "Custody proceeding" is defined as
including "proceedings in which a custody determination is one of several
issues, such as an action for divorce or separation, and includes child neglect
and dependency proceedings."12u The question then becomes whether an
121. Id. Of course, to be recognized and enforced, a decree must not have been modified
by a court exercising jurisdiction under standards "substantially similar" to those of the
UCCJA. Id.
122. Id.
123. UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988).
124. UCCJA § 14 comment, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988).
125. Id.
126. UCCJA § 14(b) & comment, 9 U.L.A. 292, 293 (1988).
127. UCCJA § 2, 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988).
128. Id. For state versions of the UCCJA that have specifically included or excluded
adoption, see infra notes 193-94.
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adoption proceeding is a "custody proceeding" within the meaning of the
Act.
Several influential commentators have concluded that an adoption proceeding is, or should be considered, a custody proceeding for purposes of
the UCCJA. In an article coauthored by the late Professor Bodenheimer,
who was the reporter for the UCCJA, the term "child custody proceedings"
was given an expansive meaning.
Child custody proceedings in the broad sense used in this article
include divorce custody disputes, guardianship, neglect and abuse
cases, adoptions and actions to terminate parental rights. In all
of these cases the core question is where and with whom a child
29
should live when something has occurred to disrupt the family.
Similarly, it has been observed that "the state's concerns in private custody
disputes, adoptions, and neglect/abandonment actions are similar, and logically the same jurisdictional rules should govern the resolution of all such
issues which have interstate elements."' 130 Finally, Professor Clark has written:
There is no question that [the definitions of custody determination and custody proceeding] could be more specific. They do,
however, seem literally to apply to proceedings for the involuntary
termination of parental rights on the grounds of dependency or
neglect, the most common grounds for that kind of remedy. And
certainly most of the cases in which parental rights are voluntarily
relinquished, or in which an adoption is in issue also result in
orders for the custody of a child along with orders respecting
the parental rights over that child. For these reasons it seems
justified to believe that the UCCJA now governs adoption and
similar proceedings.'

Given the UCCJA's silence as to whether an adoption proceeding is a
custody proceeding within the meaning of the Act, the plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation is not particularly helpful.3 2 A strong
argument can be made that, if adoption proceedings were intended to be
included, the list of covered proceedings would have included adoption
explicitly, in the same manner as child neglect and dependency proceedings.
The meaning of the silence, then, is that adoptions are not covered by the
UCCJA. On the other hand, one could argue that custody proceedings are,
in the words of the statute, those in which a "custody determination" is
129. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After
Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIs L. Ray. 229, 232 (1979).

130. McGough & Hughes, Charted Territory: The LouisianaExperience with the Uniform
Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 44 LA. L. REV. 19, 27 (1983) (citations omitted).
131. H. CL A, supra note 2, at 873-74.
132. This approach has little viability in current law; however, courts continue to use the
language, typically as a starting point before seeking the legislative purpose of the statute. See
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
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one of the issues. Thus, the meaning of custody proceeding is derivative
from that of custody determination. In adoption proceedings custody is one
of the issues to be decided; if a petition to adopt is granted, the adoptive
parent acquires the right to custody of the child. While these arguments
have some logical merit and find support in the plain-meaning rule,"' neither
argument is adequate to resolve the question. Nevertheless, the existence of
two plausible arguments might establish that the statute is ambiguous, and
thus invite the use of intrinsic and extrinsic aids to statutory construction.
Given the drafters' contemporaneous statement that the UCCJA was
intended to cover "habeas corpus actions, guardianship petitions, and
other
34

proceedingsavailable under general state law to determine custody,'

most

courts have been unwilling to infer from the silence of the text that the
exclusion of adoption was intended. Some of these courts have concluded
that adoption is covered without giving any explanation of how the result
was reached,' while most have found it necessary to resort to methods of
statutory interpretation to determine whether adoption is within the reach
of the UCCJA. 13 6 As shown below, the great weight of authority favors
application of the UCCJA in adoption proceedings. The only reported cases
cited in the literature that hold to the contrary are arguably distinguishable
37
because they involve proceedings to terminate parental rights.
Cases Holding UCCJA Applicable In Adoption
Proceedings Without Explanation
In two cases involving adoption-In re Adoption of K.C.P.138 and In re
Adoption of Baby Boy W 39-the UCCJA was applied without any discussion of whether an adoption proceeding is a custody proceeding within the
meaning of the Act. 1 Apparently, the inclusion of adoption was assumed
in both cases, as the courts focused on whether the UCCJA had been
133. Additional support could also be found for these arguments in the maxims or canons
of construction; but for each maxim, another maxim leading to a contrary result could be
cited. See Llewellyn, Remarks of the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Rnv. 395 (1950).
134. UCCJA § 2 comment, 9 U.L.A. 134 (1988) (emphasis added).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 140-49.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 166-96.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 198-207. In a recent termination of parental rights
case that did not involve adoption, the court held that the UCCJA was applicable. In re
A.E.H., 152 Wis. 2d 182, 448 N.W.2d 662, 667-68 (Ct. App. 1989), review granted sub nom.
P.C. v. C.C., 449 N.W.2d 275 (Wis. 1989) (No. 88-2022).
138. 432 So. 2d 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
139. 701 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
140. In a concurring opinion, a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court looked to the
UCCJA, together with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, to resolve a
jurisdictional conflict between Colorado, where an adoption petition had been filed, and Ohio,
where the children had been adjudicated dependent and neglected. Denver Dep't of Social
Servs. v. District Court, 742 P.2d 339, 342-43 (Colo. 1987) (Muilarkey, J., specially concurring).
The opinion for the court decided the jurisdictional issue on the basis of the Interstate Compact

alone. Id. at 342.
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violated or complied with, rather than whether the Act applied. In K.C.P.,
the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a trial court
judgment granting an adoption on the basis that the trial court had exercised
jurisdiction in violation of the UCCJA.14' There, a child was brought from
New York to Florida by his aunt and uncle. The child's putative father
initiated custody proceedings in New York and served notice on the aunt
and uncle. The aunt and uncle then initiated adoption proceedings in Florida.
The New York court notified the Florida court of the pending New York
proceeding, and, in response, the Florida court initially stayed the adoption
proceeding.
However, the attitude of the Florida court changed after the aunt and
uncle failed to persuade New York to decline jurisdiction. The Florida court,
despite notification from the New York court that New York had exercised
jurisdiction, vacated its stay. The Florida court then ignored the order of
the New York court awarding custody to the putative father, which was
filed twice in the Florida proceedings, and granted the adoption. This meant
that before the adoption was granted, the Florida court had been advised
of New York's exercise of jurisdiction on four separate occasions. The
district court of appeals found that the action of the trial court "flagrantly
ignore[d] and contradict[ed] the salutary intentions of the Act. 142 The court
quoted extensively from the purpose and simultaneous proceedings provisions of the UCCJA, vacated and reversed the final judgment granting the
adoption, and remanded "to allow enforcement of the New York custody
decree pursuant to [the Florida version of the UCCJA].' ' 3
The Missouri Court of Appeals also applied the UCCJA in an adoption
proceeding without discussing whether adoption is within its scope. In Baby
Boy W, the Court reversed and remanded a trial court order denying a
petition for transfer of legal custody to prospective adoptive parents and
transferring custody to the Missouri Division of Family Services for the
purpose of delivering the child to Indiana authorities. The court explicitly
concluded that Indiana's jurisdiction under the UCCJA was dubious, and
implicitly concluded that Missouri could exercise jurisdiction consistently
with the Act. 1" Baby Boy W was born in Indiana and was brought to
Missouri when he was five days old by the prospective adoptive parents,
who had obtained the biological mother's consent to the adoption and had
notified the Interstate Compact offices in both states. 145 Subsequently, the
141. K.C.P., 432 So. 2d at 622.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Baby Boy W, 701 S.W.2d at 546.
145. The trial court determined that Baby Boy W had been brought to Missouri in violation
of the Interstate Compact and ordered his return to Indiana. Id. at 541. The appellate court
opined that the evidence supported the conclusion that compliance had occurred, but that no
determination had been made as to whether the Compact applied in private adoptions. Id. at
542. On remand, the trial court would be required to make that determination first, before
considering whether there had been compliance. The trial court's decision was based on the
Interstate Compact and the lack of consent to the adoption. There is no indication that UCCJA
issues were raised or decided by the trial court.
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biological father, who had not consented to the adoption, initiated paternity
proceedings in Indiana. 14 The prospective adoptive parents were not parties
to the paternity proceeding and no summons was issued to them. It is
unclear whether the prospective adoptive parents had actual knowledge of
the pending paternity proceeding when they initiated adoption proceedings
in Missouri two weeks later. 147 The paternity proceeding culminated in an
order establishing paternity, awarding child support, awarding custody to
the biological mother, and granting visitation to the biological father. The
Indiana court was not advised of the pending adoption or of the fact that
the child was in Missouri.
The biological parents appeared and participated in the Missouri adoption
proceeding. Rather than relying on the Indiana judgment in their effort to
block the adoption, the biological mother sought to revoke her consent on
the basis of duress and coercion, while the biological father maintained that
his consent was required because he had not abandoned or neglected the
child.
Under these facts, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the UCCJA
required that the biological parents disclose to the Indiana court the existence
of the adoption proceeding then pending in Missouri, the fact that the
mother had signed a consent form, and the fact that the child was physically
present in Missouri. Further, the court found that the UCCJA required
issuance of a summons to the prospective adoptive parents and their joinder
as parties. As a result of these deficiencies, the court concluded that the
Indiana judgment "can have no effect upon the custody of the child as it
may relate to other parties."'14 Implicit in the court's decision was the
determination that under the UCCJA, the Indiana judgment was not entitled
to recognition and enforcement in Missouri and that Missouri had jurisdic49
tion' in the adoption proceeding under the Act.
Another case contains explicit language to the effect that the UCCJA
applies in adoption, but provides no explanation in support of that conclusion. In Noga v. Noga5 0 the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld a trial court

decision that a pending adoption proceeding in Arkansas deprived Illinois
of jurisdiction over a grandmother's petition for visitation.", There, the
parents were divorced in Illinois, and the mother remarried. The mother,
146. The paternity proceeding encompassed issues of filiation, custody, visitation and support. Id. at 538.
147. The opinion of the Court of Appeals does not disclose any evidence in this regard. If
the prospective parents knew of the paternity proceeding and the claims to custody made by
the biological parents, the UCCJA would require that the information be disclosed to the
Missouri court and that the Missouri court communicate with the Indiana court.
148. Id. at 545-46.
149. The court did not identify the UCCJA grounds upon which Missouri's exercise of
jurisdiction would be based. However, the court stated that "[a]ll of the parties asserting any
claim have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and do not contest the jurisdiction." Id.
Even so, consent of the parties, though adequate for personal jurisdiction, would not confer
subject matter jurisdiction if it was otherwise lacking under the UCCJA.
150. 111 Ill.
App. 3d 328, 443 N.E.2d 1142 (1982).
151. Id., 443 N.E.2d at 1145.
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children, and stepfather relocated to Arkansas, where a proceeding for a
step-parent adoption was commenced. The court stated, "As the adoption
appears to be a custody proceeding within the scope of the UCCJA over
which the Arkansas courts have asserted jurisdiction, the Illinois courts must
decline to do so. ' ' 152 The court cited as authority the Illinois version of
section 6 of the UCCJA 153 and a pre-UCCJA case, which held that a divorce
court's continuing jurisdiction over child custody is terminated by an adoption.'1 The court did not elaborate on why adoption appears to be within
the scope of the Act, but moved on to apply the simultaneous proceeding
provision and to determine that under the circumstances Arkansas was the
more appropriate forum. 15 5 Less direct language is found in E.E.B. v.
D.A.,5 5 which has been cited for the proposition that the UCCJA applies
in adoptions. 5 7 In fact, E.E.B. involved conflicting habeas corpus proceedings in Ohio and New Jersey, not an adoption proceeding. Perhaps the
cases citing E.E.B. relied on the statement of the New Jersey Supreme
Court that "[w]hile UCCJA focuses on custody disputes between family
members, its operative provisions are broad enough to include a dispute
between a natural parent and adoptive parents."'5 8 This statement does lend
support to the view that the UCCJA applies in adoptions where natural
parents and adoptive parents may be disputants. However, in the context
of the facts of the case, the court's statement may be more narrowly and
correctly interpreted to establish that the Act applied in habeas corpus
59
proceedings.
The facts of E.E.B. show that all of the parties resided in Ohio when
the adoption placement occurred. The biological mother soon changed her
mind about the adoption and sought to revoke her surrender of parental
rights.l 6 She initiated a habeas corpus proceeding to regain custody of the
152. Id., 443 N.E.2d at 1145.

153. ILL. Ray.

STAT.

ch. 40, para. 2107(a) (1979) (simultaneous proceedings).

154. Noga, 443 N.E.2d at 1145 (citing People ex rel. Bachleda v. Dean, 48 I11. 2d 16, 268
N.E.2d 11, 13 (1971)).
155. Id. at 1145. There was no indication in the case whether the father continued to reside
in Illinois, thereby preserving Illinois' continuing jurisdiction. The Court viewed his residence
as immaterial because he had subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts and
was in the process of appealing the termination of his parental rights there. Id.
156. 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 871 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, reh'g denied, 460 U.S.
1104 (1983). The decision in this case was based on both the UCCJA and the PKPA.
157. Gainey v. Olivo, 258 Ga. 640, 373 S.E.2d 4, 6 n.5 (1988); In re Adoption of B.E.W.G.,
379 Pa. Super. 264, 549 A.2d 1286, 1290 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 628, 558 A.2d 530
(1989) ("New Jersey Court had jurisdiction of adoption proceeding under Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, notwithstanding habeas corpus/custody action in Ohio, where Ohio
court had declined to exercise its jurisdiction.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
158. E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 878.
159. Id. "We conclude that the Ohio habeas corpus decree is included within the operative
provisions of UCCJA." Id.
160. Within a week of the child's birth, the mother informed the agency that she had
changed her mind and wanted her child back. The agency failed to inform the court, and the
mother's surrender was approved by the court without knowledge of her attempted revocation.
Id. at 873.
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child from the prospective adoptive parents and was unsuccessful at both
the trial (juvenile court) and intermediate appellate court levels. Ultimately,
she prevailed in the Ohio Supreme Court, but by that time the prospective
adoptive father's employment had required that the family move to New
Jersey. Upon remand, the juvenile court in Ohio issued a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of the biological mother, but without holding a best
interests hearing as requested by the prospective adoptive parents. In search
of relief from the Ohio writ of habeas corpus, the prospective adoptive
parents initiated a custody proceeding in New Jersey. The biological mother
challenged the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court to conduct a best interests
hearing on the basis of the full faith and credit clause, the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the UCCJA.
The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the New Jersey proceeding
as a modification of the Ohio writ and held that, pursuant to the UCCJA,
New Jersey could exercise jurisdiction because Ohio, by failing to hold a
best interests hearing, had declined to do S0.161 The court reached the same
conclusion under the PKPA. 62 Since neither proceeding was an adoption
proceeding, the court's task with regard to the applicability of the UCCJA
was made easier. A habeas corpus proceeding is specifically mentioned in
the official commentary to the UCCJA as included within the definition of
a custody proceeding; 16 the same is not true of adoption.
The value of E.E.B. in resolving the issue of the applicability of the
UCCJA in adoption is in its use for purposes of analogy. The relationship
between the parties to the habeas corpus proceeding in E.E.B. is the same
as the relationship between the parties in an adoption proceeding, that is,
the adoptive parents are vying against the biological parents for the right
to rear the child. However, the fundamental differences between the two
proceedings caution against interpreting E.E.B. as holding that the UCCJA
applies in an adoption proceeding. An adoption accomplishes a change in
existing legal relationships with a consequential effect on the right to custody. Adoptive parents acquire the right to custody of the child as a result
of the creation of the parent-child relationship between them and the
termination of the parent-child relationship between the biological parent
and the child.1 4 In contrast, the parent-child relationship is unaffected in a
habeas corpus proceeding in which the objective is the enforcement of a
65
preexisting claim to custody1
161. Id. at 880. The Court did not consider whether a habeas corpus proceeding in Ohio is
broad enough to permit a best interests inquiry before concluding that the failure to do so is
equivalent to declining jurisdiction. Cf. H. CARx, supra note 2, at 793 ("although there are
some states in which habeas corpus addresses only the limited question of who has a legal
right to the child under a prior decree or on some other basis providing a clear legal right, in
most jurisdictions the petition for the writ opens up the broad question of what jurisdiction
will best serve the child's interest ... .") (citations omitted).
162. E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 880.
163. UCCJA § 2 comment, 9 U.L.A. 134 (1980).
164. H. CARK, supra note 2, at 850.
165. Id. at 792-93.
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Cases Holding UCCJA Applicable by Statutory Interpretation
Fortunately, most of the other cases that have held that the UCCJA
applies to adoptions have arrived at that result through the use of one or
more methods of statutory interpretation. Most begin with something akin
to a plain-meaning approach, supplemented by consideration of the purpose
of. the legislation.
In Souza v. Superior Court, a case involving a step-parent adoption, the
California Court of Appeal held that where Hawaii had exercised continuing
jurisdiction over custody, a California court was required either to stay a
pending adoption and contact the Hawaii court or to dismiss the adoption
proceeding.'6 In that case, the adoption proceeding was commenced in
California before the natural father filed a motion for visitation in Hawaii,
where custody had first been determined in divorce proceedings. By analogy
to guardianship proceedings, the court concluded that both the UCCJA and
the PKPA are applicable to adoption proceedings. 67 In response to the
stepfather's argument that the UCCJA is inapplicable in an adoption proceeding, the court said:
This argument is clearly wrong. The UCCJA regulates custody
of children. An adoption proceeding to terminate parental custody rights is clearly a custody-determining proceeding of the
Patently, a stepparent adoption, with its
most drastic kind ....
potential for completely terminating the natural father's custodial
rights, is a custody-determining procedure and is ... subject to
the UCCJA and the PKPA.'6
The court first used the plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation
and found that adoption is a custody-determining procedure. By reference
to the definition of custody as set out in California case law, the court
rejected the existence of any ambiguity. Then, the court buttressed its
conclusion by considering the question in light of the purposes for which
the UCCJA was enacted. If tlie Act were not applied, children would be
"vulnerable to the very abuses the Act seeks to cure."' 69 Subsequent cases
have not viewed the persuasive authority of Souza as limited to step-parent
adoptions.1 70 The same risk of permanent loss of custody exists in thirdparty adoptions unless the biological parent's rights have been terminated
previously. In In re Adoption of B.E. W.G., 171 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that the UCCJA deprived Pennsylvania of jurisdiction in an
adoption proceeding when a custody proceeding was pending in New York.
Like the court in Souza, the court in B.E. W.G. sought to interpret the Act
166. Souza v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1304, 1312, 238 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897 (1987).
167. Id., 238 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93.
168. Id., 238 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.E.W.G., 379 Pa. Super. 264, 549 A.2d 1286 (1988);
Gainey v. Olivo, 258 Ga. 640, 373 S.E.2d 4 (1988).
171. B.E.W.G., 549 A.2d at 1290.

1990]

JURISDICTION IN INTERSTATE ADOPTION

645

consistently with its purposes. Rather than focus on the similarity between
adoption and other proceedings covered by the UCCJA, as did the Souza
court, the court in B.E. W.G. focused on the need to avoid frustration of
the UCCJA's goals. The facts of B.E. W. G. provide a clear illustration of
an attempt by the biological father to evade the intended result of the
UCCJA. After the father murdered the mother in New York, the maternal
grandparents sought custody of the children in the courts there. Initially,
they were denied custody but were granted visitation rights, pending the
outcome of the father's criminal case. Upon his conviction, they were
granted temporary, then permanent, custody.
While the custody proceeding was pending, but before custody was awarded
to the grandparents, the father relinquished the children to a Pennsylvania
agency for adoption placement. The children were placed, and an adoption
petition was filed in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania court was informed
that a custody proceeding had been initiated in New York and sought
assurance from the attorney for petitioners that New York had not already
exercised jurisdiction. There is no indication of assurance having been given;
however, the adoption was granted on the basis of the father's consent. A
year later, the grandparents learned of the children's whereabouts and sought
to obtain access to the adoption records and to vacate the adoption.
Following a successful appeal of a trial court determination that they lacked
standing,172 the grandparents argued on remand that Pennsylvania lacked
jurisdiction in the adoption under the UCCJA. Again, they were unsuccessful at the trial court, but on appeal the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that "[i]n order to prevent by adoption that which cannot be achieved
by custody proceedings, the provisions of the Uniform Act must also be
applied to adoption proceedings." 173 Thus, the court interpreted the UCCJA
in a manner that would not frustrate its purposes.
Citing the Pennsylvania version of the purposes section of the UCCJA,
the court continued:
Our holding is consistent with the reasons for adopting the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the stated purposes
thereof. These include, inter alia, the avoidance of "jurisdictional
competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters
of child custody"; the promotion of "cooperation with the courts
of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in
that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the
child"; the assurance "that litigation concerning the custody of
a child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child
and his family have the closest connection"; the deterrence of
"abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken
to obtain custody awards." 17 4
172. In re Adoption of B.E.W.G., 355 Pa. Super 554, 513 A.2d 1061 (1986), appeal denied,
521 Pa. 628, 558 A.2d 530 (1989).
173. B.E.W.G., 549 A.2d at 1290.
174. Id. (citation omitted).
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The court vacated and set aside the adoption decree without discussion of
the best interests of the children, who had been with the adoptive parents
for more than four years at the time the decision was rendered.17 5
In Gainey v. Olivo, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, "considering
[its] purposes and language," the UCCJA should be construed to include
adoption. 17 6 The court was persuaded by the official comment to the UCCJA
that 'custody proceeding' is to be understood in a broad sense,' 77 and,
giving a broad reading to the term, agreed with the court in Souza that
adoption is a "custody-determining procedure.'1 7 The court also cited
approvingly two law review articles that favor construing the UCCJA to
include adoption. 7 9 The article written by "the drafter and reporter for the
UCCJA" 110 appears to have carried great weight with the court. Emphasizing
the purpose of the Act, the court noted that "[tihe application of the
UCCJA to this adoption proceeding would have, among other things,
prevented jurisdictional competition, promoted interstate cooperation, and,
most importantly, prevented the continued disruption of a child's life. ' " 8'
Like the courts in Souza and B.E.W.G., the Georgia Supreme Court perceived that the broader interpretation of the Act was needed because interstate adoption posed the same problems as other forms of interstate custody
litigation.
The facts of Gainey8 2 present another picture of the kind of forum
shopping and judicial parochialism that the UCCJA seeks to avoid. Over
the opposition of the putative father, the biological mother of a child born
in New York placed the child for adoption with a New York agency. Both
the putative father and the biological mother lived in New York. The
putative father initiated paternity and custody proceedings in New York,
and the agency transferred the child to an attorney who brought the child
to Georgia for placement with the Gaineys as prospective adoptive parents.
Before the New York court had ruled on paternity and custody, but after

175. Id. at 1291.
176. Gainey v. Olivo, 258 Ga. 649, 373 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1988). Gainey was decided on the basis
of GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-42(3) (1982) prior to its amendment to specifically include adoption.

The Georgia Supreme Court was aware of the amendment. Gainey, 373 S.E.2d at 4. The bill
amending the UCCJA was introduced in response to objections to the intermediate appellate
court's holding that was reversed in Gainey. Note, Domestic Relations, 5 GA. ST. U.L. REv.
377 n.5 (1988). The court held in Olivo v. Gainey, 185 Ga. App. 427, 364 S.E.2d 279, 280
(1987), modified, 258 Ga. 640, 373 S.E.2d 4 (1988), that the UCCJA did not apply in adoption.
177. Gainey, 373 S.E.2d at 6 (citing UCCJA § 2 comment, 9 U.L.A. 134 (1988)).
178. Id. at 6 (quoting Souza v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1304, 238 Cal. Rptr. 892,
895 (1987)).
179. Id. at 6 (citing Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 121; McGough & Hughes,
Charted Territory: The Louisiana Experience with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, 44 LA. L. Ray. 19, 27 (1983)).
180. Id. It is not apparent whether the Court viewed the Bodenheimer and Neeley-Kvarme
article as authority that the legislature had the specific intent to include adoption or as authority
that the purpose of the UCCJA was broad enough to include adoption.
181. Gainey, 373 S.E.2d at 6.
182. Id. at 4, 5.
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the New York court ordered the attorney to disclose the child's whereabouts,
the Gaineys filed a petition in Georgia to terminate the putative father's
parental rights and to adopt the child. The putative father contested the
adoption and raised the issue of the New York proceeding. Subsequently,
the New York court issued orders establishing the putative father as the
legal father of the child, reserving jurisdiction to determine custody and
forbidding the adoption in Georgia until the custody issue was determined.
Despite the transmittal of certified copies of the New York court's orders
to the Georgia court, the Georgia court proceeded to terminate the father's
parental rights and grant the adoption. On these facts, the Georgia Supreme
Court concluded that the trial court "should have deferred to the New York
court ... because the New York court was 'exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [the UCCJA]' (citation omitted)."' 8 Most recently,
in Foster v. Stein, 1 4 a Michigan court joined the ranks of those concluding
that the UCCJA applies in adoption. The Michigan case is especially interesting because the Michigan legislgture had amended its version of the Act
to delete language that specifically included adoption as a custody proceeding.'85 Notwithstanding that affirmative act of the legislature, the Michigan
Court of Appeals used the plain-meaning approach to statutory construction
to conclude that adoption remains within the scope of the UCCJA.116 Instead
of limiting the inquiry to whether adoption is a proceeding in which a
"custody determination" is made, as the courts did in Souza, B.E.W.G.,
and Gainey, the Foster court sought the plain meaning of "dependency
proceeding," one of the specified proceedings in the UCCJA. Using the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of "dependency," 1 the court held that
"adoption proceedings are included in the definition of a 'custody proceeding' because they are in the nature of a dependency proceeding."' 8 The
court also agreed with the Souza and Gainey courts that "an adoption
proceeding to terminate parental custody rights is clearly a custody-determining proceeding of the most dramatic kind ....

"189

By relying on the legislative history of the amendment, the court avoided
the seemingly logical conclusion that the deletion of adoption proceedings
183. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
184. 183 Mich. App. 424, 454 N.W.2d 244 (1990).
185. The former Michigan version of section 2(c) of the UCCJA provided: 'Custody
proceeding' includes proceedings in which a custody determination is one of several issues,
such as an action for divorce or separation, and .includes child neglect, dependency, and
adoption proceedings." Id., 454 N.W.2d at 246 (court's emphasis). The amended version that
was construed by the court provided: 'Custody proceeding' includes proceedings in which a
custody determination is 1 of several issues, such as an action for divorce or separation, and
includes child neglect and dependency proceedings." Id.
186. Id., 454 N.W.2d at 246-47.
187. "A relation between two persons, where one is sustained by another or looks to or
relies on aid of another for support or for reasonable necessaries consistent with dependent's
position in life." Id., 454 N.W.2d at 246 (quoting BLAcK's LAW DicToNARY 393 (5th ed.
1979)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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from the definition of custody proceedings showed the intent of the legislature to exclude adoption from the coverage of the UCCJA. Initially, the
court acknowledged that the first analysis of the amending bill "states that
the bill would amend the statute to exclude adoption proceedings from the
custody proceedings covered by the Act, but [the first analysis] gives no
indication as to why the change was to be made." 190 The court then sought
the reasons for the change and found that "one of the primary reasons for
amending the statute was to make the language of the statute consistent
with that of other states under the UCCJA."' 91 With consistency identified
as the goal of the amendment, the court made a great leap in logic to
conclude that, notwithstanding the change in language, the statute should
be interpreted to include adoption. 19
Missing in the court's analysis is something to indicate that the legislative
intent was to conform Michigan's version of the UCCJA to that of the
states where adoption is included rather than to that of the states where
adoption is excluded. While the court noted approvingly that Georgia had
amended its version of the Act to include adoption, 93 the court did not
consider the two states whose versions explicitly excluded adoption. 94 Further, the court failed to reconcile its conclusion with the portion of the
legislative history that explained the amendment as removing the "requirement that in all adoption proceedings courts be notified as to whether there
' 95
are any competing custody proceedings for the child in another state.' 9
The requirement was described as "extraneous and irrelevant" because it
was rarely enforced within the state, other states did not have the same
requirement, and competing custody disputes in other states were rare.'"
Given this strong evidence of the intent of the legislature to remove adoption
from the scope of the UCCJA, the court's method of divining a legislative
intent to the contrary remains unknown. In support of the result reached
by the court, it may be argued that the legislative facts that formed the
basis for the amendment were erroneous (the majority of the courts that
have considered the issue have held that the UCCJA applies in adoption)
190. Id., 454 N.W.2d at 247.
191. Id.
192. The court ignored the fact that 43 states have versions of the UCCJA that are silent
on adoption and that, of the 43, the courts in only a few have interpreted the UCCJA to
include adoption. See supra text accompanying notes 140-91.
193. Foster, 454 N.W.2d at 247. Montana (Mo NT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103 (1989)) and the
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4503 (1989)) also have versions of the UCCJA
that specifically include adoption.
194. N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 458-A:2 (1983); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 75-c (McKinney

1988). Other versions of the UCCJA that indicate a lack of consistency among states include
TtM . CODE ANN. § 36-6-202 (1984) (excludes "other proceedings pursuant to Title 37" where
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is codified) and NEB. Ray. STAT. § 431202(3) (1988) (defining custody proceeding to include "proceedings to determine custody ...
after a court has denied a petition for adoption").
195. Foster, 454 N.W.2d at 247 (quoting Fact Sheet on Legislation for House Bill 4577,
May 19, 1981).
196. Foster,454 N.W.2d at 247.
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and that the result promotes the purposes of the Act. Yet, the court's
usurpation of the legislative function raises serious doubt about the correctness of this case.
In an unreported case, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the UCCJA
applied in an adoption proceeding and that dismissal of the action was
appropriate where the requirements of the Act were not satisfied.' 97
Cases Holding UCCJA Inapplicable
Two cases-Williams v. Knott,198 from Texas, and In re Johnson,l99 from
Indiana-have been cited as holding that the UCCJA is inapplicable in
adoption proceedings. 2m Both cases may be read narrowly to hold that the
UCCJA is inapplicable in proceedings to terminate parental rights. Although
Williams involved the appeal of a judgment terminating parental rights and
granting an adoption, the court focused exclusively on the termination
issue. 201 In Johnson, the action was for termination only, but the termination
statute was codified as part of the chapter governing adoption. 2
In Williams, the parents were divorced in Oklahoma, the mother was
awarded custody and, after her remarriage, moved to Texas with the stepfather and child. An action for termination of the father's parental rights
and adoption by the stepfather was brought in Texas. The father, who
remained an Oklahoma domiciliary and resident, challenged the jurisdiction
of the Texas court on the basis that Oklahoma had continuing jurisdiction
under both the UCCJA and the PKPA.
In upholding jurisdiction in Texas, the court applied section 11.051 of
the Texas Family Code, which allows status or subject matter jurisdiction
in termination actions to be based on the jurisdictional provisions contained
in the Texas version of the UCCJA. 203 Section 11.051 is not a part of the
Texas UCCJA, but it incorporates by reference the Act's provisions. The
court reasoned that the jurisdictional requisites of the UCCJA, as incor197. Roth v. Hatfield, Nos. 92CA19-82CA20, -82CA21 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1983)
(LEXIS, State library). Two other unreported Ohio cases have considered the applicability of
the UCCJA in adoption with conflicting results. In In re Adoption of Woodruff, No. 1125
(Ohio Ct. App. December 31, 1984) (LEXIS, State library), the court held that an application
for a preadoptive placement is a custody proceeding to which the UCCJA applies. In In re
Adoption of White, No. 80-CA-25 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1982) (LEXIS, State library) the
court held UCCJA inapplicable in adoption proceeding which is governed exclusively by
adoption statutes.
198. Williams v. Knott, 690 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
199. In re Johnson, 415 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
200. See Gainey v. Olivo, 258 Ga. 640, 373 S.E.2d 4, 6 n.5 (1988) .
201. Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 605. Since the judgment terminating the father's parental
rights was reversed, there was no need for the court to reach the issue of adoption. Absent
consent or termination of parental rights, an adoption may not be granted. Tax. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 16.03 (Vernon 1986).
202. Johnson, 415 N.E.2d at 110-11.
203. Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 607. "In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the

court may exercise status or subject matter jurisdiction over the suit as provided by Subchapter
B of this chapter [UCCJA]." Tax. FAm.

CODE

ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon 1986).
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porated into section 11.051, were satisfied because Texas had home state
and significant connection jurisdiction.2 However, the court did not apply
the UCCJA; it applied section 11.051. The court did not reach the question
of whether the Act applies in adoption because of its reliance on section
11.051. However, the court did determine that a termination of parental
rights proceeding is not a custody determination within the meaning of the
20 5
PKPA.
In Johnson, the father sought to terminate the mother's parental rights
in Indiana, the state of his residence. The mother was a California resident.
The child resided in Illinois with her paternal grandparents who were her
custodians. The father had not remarried, and apparently no adoption was
then contemplated. The mother challenged the jurisdiction of Indiana on
the basis that Indiana lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA.
The court held that termination proceedings were governed by the jurisdictional requisites of the adoption statutes, not by the UCCJA. While
conceding that a termination proceeding is "the ultimate determination of
child custody as to that parent," the court nonetheless concluded that
"[tlermination of parental rights is a statutory mechanism which permits a
child to be adopted without the consent of a parent," and not an action
to establish or modify a custody decree.2 Because no adoption petition
had been filed and because no adoption was contemplated, this case could
be read narrowly to address the issue of the applicability of the UCCJA to
termination of parental rights. However, the termination statute was codified
as part of the adoption statutes, and, therefore, such a narrow reading
would appear unwarranted.
Regardless of whether a narrow or broad reading is given to the case,
Johnson is scant authority. A rule that jurisdiction exists for purposes of
termination of parental rights where the only connection to the forum is
the petitioner father's residence is clearly wrong. Moreover, if the forum
would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate custody, how could it exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate a find and irrevocable end to the parent-child relationship. 2°7 Thus, neither Williams nor Johnson provides any significant
basis for disagreement with the weight of case authority that the UCCJA
applies in adoption.
The Unresolved Issue of the Constitutionalityof the UCCJA
The advantages of applying the UCCJA in adoption proceedings are the
same as in divorce custody proceedings-certainty, predictability, and consistency from state to state, at least to the extent that any uniform act can
achieve truly uniform results.2 Although the cases and commentators gen204. Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 607-08.
205. Id. at 608-09.
206. Id.
207. Cf. In re A.E.H., 152 Wis. 2d 182, 448 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Ct. App. 1989).
208. Because uniform acts can be amended by state legislatures, their uniformity can be
undercut. Other approaches to obtain uniformity in interstate state matters, such as federal
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erally favor applying the UCCJA in adoption, there are some concerns yet
to be addressed, especially when an absent parent's rights are to be adjudicated. As noted earlier, many of the concerns expressed here are applicable
only when termination of parental rights occurs as part of the adoption.
The problem of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident biological parent
could be avoided if parental rights were terminated in a state having personal
jurisdiction.2 The adoption, the second step of the procedure in which a
new parent-child relationship is created, could then be accomplished in the
state having jurisdiction for that purpose. 210 The requirement of a separate
termination action could easily have the effect of thwarting desirable adoptions.

211

The due process limits on UCCJA jurisdiction in adoption have not been
articulated by the courts. The Supreme Court has not passed on the constitutionality of the Act as applied in a divorce custody where in personam
jurisdiction over a parent is lacking. However, state courts have consistently
held that due process does not require personal jurisdiction for a state to
exercise UCCJA jurisdiction over an absent parent in a divorce custody
proceeding. Notice and the opportunity to be heard pursuant to the Act
have been deemed sufficient.2 12 In re Marriage of Leonard2l3 relied on the
provisions of the UCCJA permitting the forum court to obtain evidence in
another state with the assistance of the court there and the provision in the
Act for payment of costs of transportation as mitigating factors in assessing
the inconvenience to the nonresident parent. 2 4 The same alternatives would

be available in adoption, but, given the higher stakes, a court could conclude
that due process should afford greater protection.
It has been argued from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kulko v.
Superior Court215 that the Court might apply InternationalShoe216 requirements of minimum contacts to custody disputes. 21 7 Kulko involved the
application of a long-arm statute to subject an out-of-state parent to the

legislation and interstate compacts allow for less variation. Reisman & Simson, Interstate
Agreements in the American FederalSystem, 27 RTrraGs L. Rv. 70, 81-82 (1973).
209. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 461, 875.
210. Adoption, i.e., the second step, may not be possible in the state that has personal
jurisdiction over the biological parent because the adoptive parents have neither residence nor
domicile there.
211. The potentially catastrophic effects of requiring personal jurisdiction in adoption have
been recognized by Professors Clark and Hazard. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 461, 875;
Hazard, May v. Anderson: Prelude to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 379 (1959).
212. Morrell v. Giesick, 188 Mont. 89, 610 P.2d 1189 (1980); Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 246
Ga. 24, 268 S.E.2d 648 (1980).
213. 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1951).
214. Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12.
215. 436 U.S. 84, 100-01, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978) (California lacked jurisdiction
to modify child support pursuant to a long arm statute, where father lacked minimum contacts
with California; assertion of jurisdiction violated due process).
216. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
217. See, e.g., Due Process,supra note 24, at 414-17.
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jurisdiction of the court in an action to increase child support. Professor
Bodenheimer and Neeley-Kvarme have acknowledged that Kulko might
preclude the use of a long-arm statute to acquire custody jurisdiction, but
they have argued that it does not portend the imposition of minimum
contacts requirements in custody. 218 Shaffer v. Heitner, on which Kulko
relied, recognized an exception to the minimum contacts requirement for
status adjudications, 219 and, they argue, as a status proceeding with particularized jurisdictional rules, custody falls within the exception. 0 Bodenheimer and Neeley-Kvarme have also argued that the apprehension that May
v. Anderson will be applied to require personal jurisdiction has little foundation.22l In addition to the historical evidence that courts have not done
so in the past, they point to the "demonstrated increasing concern for
children" shown by the Supreme Court in recent years.m
Others have not been as confident that the UCCJA could withstand a
constitutional challenge.m2 Even if Bodenheimer and Neeley-Kvarme have
correctly anticipated the law as it relates to divorce custody, the differences
between divorce custody and adoption suggest the possibility of a different
result. Adoption proceedings differ from interparental custody disputes in
at least two important respects. First, divorce custody disputes may result
in the temporary suspension of some parental rights, but adoption has the
effect of terminating parental rights permanently. A parent who loses custody retains residual parental rightsn 4 Indeed, that parent's rights may be
restored fully by a subsequent custody determination. A parent whose child
is adopted by another loses not only custody, but also loses forever the
right to have any further contact with the child.m
Second, and relatedly, a custody determination does not result in a final
judgment; the order is modifiable.n While prerequisites may exist, custody
can be reexamined and if necessary changed. Changes in custody are not
rare nor are they especially difficult to obtain.227 An adoption, on the other
hand, results in a final judgment that is not subject to modification.2
218. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 129, at 238-40 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
219. 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977).
220. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 129, at 240.
221. Id. at 243, 248-52.
222. Id. at 250-52.
223. See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 86, at 347-48.
224. Residual rights may include the right to custody upon the death of the custodial parent,
the right to consent to the marriage of the child, or the right to obtain certain information
about the child, such as information contained in school records.
225. There may be an opportunity for the natural parent to have contact with the child
through the intercession of a state adoption registry. However, the consent of the child is
required. Thus, there is no right of the natural parent to have contact.
226. H. Cmm, supra note 2, at 836.
227. See generally Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YArn
L.J. 757 (1985).
228. See Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAm. L.Q. 173, 178
(1983).
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Although the judgment may be vacated on the basis of fraud or lack of
jurisdiction, z2 9 the virtue of finality is apparent where new family relationships have been created and the child has been integrated into the adoptive
family. Absent extraordinary circumstances, in adoption the biological parent has but one opportunity to litigate her continued relationship with her
child. Thus, the potential loss to a parent who is required to litigate an
adoption proceeding in an out-of-state forum is far greater than the potential
loss to a parent who is required to litigate a custody dispute long distance,
and fairness considerations may differ accordingly.
Despite these differences, Professor Clark has argued that a line of
adoption cases after Stanley v. Ilinoie ° gives "little prospect that May v.
Anderson will be relied upon to require personal jurisdiction over fathers
in proceedings for adoption or for termination of parental rights.'"2' Because
these cases dealt with the rights of unwed fathers, not mothers, and did
not involve out-of-state parents, their use is necessarily limited. However,
to the extent that they reflect the Court's recognition of the pragmatic
difficulties presented by adoption and the need to tailor due process requirements in a manner that does not frustrate adoption, they lend some
support to the view that the constitutionality of the UCCJA as applied to
adoption would be upheld.
Conclusion
The overwhelming weight of case authority favors applying the UCCJA
in adoption. In situations like that described in the introductory hypothetical,
the Act would provide some answers. The jurisdictional competition between
states A and B could be resolved, if not on the basis of the jurisdictional
grounds set out in the UCCJA, then on the basis of the Act's first in time
rule. Although the application of the Act would bring far more certainty
and predictability to an area of law that lacks both, it is not an easy fix.
Constitutional questions remain to be answered when the parental rights of
an out-of-state parent are terminated in an adoption proceeding without in
personam jurisdiction. However, it seems likely, given the nature of the
interests involved, that some accommodation to facilitate adoption will be
made.

229. H. CLAK, supra note 2, at 936-38.
230. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The subsequent cases were: In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36
N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
231. H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 861 (citations omitted).

